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In the SupreiDe Court
of the State of Utah
NATIONAL FINANCE COMPANY
OF PROVO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
DALLAS E. DALEY and
FLORA DALEY,
Defendants and Appellants.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Intermediate Appeal from the Order of the
2nd Judicial Court for Weber County
Hon. Parley E. Norseth, Judge
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff-respondent
upon a judgement made and entered by the Ogden City
Court, the defendants-appellants having been adjudicated
bankrupts and discharged in bankruptcy after the entry
of the Judgment and prior to the filing of the suit
upon such judgment, the plaintiff-respondent replying
that such judgment is excepted from discharge in
bankruptcy as a result of the false representations of
the defendants in incurring the debt which was merged
into the judgment.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Defendants-appellants moved the lower court for
a judgment upon the pleadings. The District Court
denied such motion and defendants have brought this
intermediate appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-appellants seek a reversal, as a matter
of law, of the order of the District Court denying their
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff-appellant
seeks to have such order affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter comes before the above entitled Court
upon an intermediate appeal from an Order of the
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, denying
defendants Motion for Judgment upon the pleadings.
There has been no evidence taken in the case, and
the appeal is based entirely upon the record and
pleadings filed in the District Court.
On the 29th day of May, 1958, the defendants made,
executed and delivered to the plaintiff their written
promissory note in the principal sum of $577.69, when
such note was not paid, the plaintiff brought an action
in the City Court of Ogden City, Weber County, State
of Utah, against the defendants which suit was bas~d
upon the promissory note. Thereafter, on the 7th day
of January, the said Ogden City Court entered a Default
Judgment against each of the defendants for the sum of
$668.12, such amount being the amount of the note plus
the accrued interest thereon to the date of the Judgment
and Court costs.
2
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On or about the 17th day of February, 1961, the
plaintiff filed this action in the District Court of Weber
County, State of Utah, alleging in, its Complaint that
the plaintiff had on the 7th day of January, 1959, in
an action filed in the City Court of Ogden. City, Weber
County, State of Utah, entitled National Finance of
Provo, plaintiff -vs- Dallas E. Daley and Flora Daley,
defendants, Civil No. 29232, a Judgment was duly made
and entered by the City Court in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants therein for the sum of
$668.12 together with interest thereon at the rate of
eight (8%) per annum from the date thereof and that
such Judgment remains wholly unpaid and unsatisfied.
The plaintiff by its Complaint in the District Court
action sought a new judgment for the sum of $668.12,
interest and Court costs.
To such complaint, the defendants filed their
answer alleging that on the 23rd day of May, 1959, the
defendants, and each of them, filed their petition in
the United States Court for the District of Utah and
were duly adjudicated bankrupts; that the plaintiff's
claim was scheduled therein and that the defendants were
discharged as bankrupts in accordance with the acts
of Congress relating to bankruptcy.
Defendants by their answer are claiming that the
claim upon which plaintiff's complaint was based has
been discharged in bankruptcy and that such bankruptcy
is a bar to the prosecution of the above entitled action.
At the time of the pre-trial of the above entitled
action, the Court authorized plaintiff to file its Reply
and plaintiff did file its Reply in this action alleging
in part as follows:
3
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"Plaintiff alleges and states that if the defendants
or either of them secured an order of discharge
in bankruptcy or have been adjudicated bankrupts,
that such discharge or such adjudication in bankruptcy does not and will not operate to discharge
or release the obligation sued upon herein, for
the reason that such obligation constitutes a
liability for obtaining money or property by
false pretenses or false representations within
the meaning of Section 17a ( 2) of the Bankruptcy
Act, in that the defendants on or about the 29th
day of May, 1958, obtained a loan of money
from the plaintiff in the sum of $577.69, with
interest upon $300.00 thereof at the rate of 3%
per month and upon $277.69 thereof at the rate of
1% per month from the date of such loan, and
defendants delivered to plaintiff their promissory
note as evidence thereof, which loan was secured
through the making and publishing of a materially
false statement of defendant's indebtedness upon
which the plaintiff relied in making said loan
to the defendants ; that in said statement,
defendants misrepresented the amount of their
indebtedness to other creditors and failed to
disclose, but rather concealed, obligations owing
to various other creditors in an amount in excess
of the sum of $2,066.00 over and above the amount
of the indebtedness disclosed by such statement;
that the misrepresentations of the defendants
were material and were relied upon by the
plaintiff to its damage and prejudice.
"That the plaintiff, on or about the 5th day of
4
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December, 1958 brought suit against the defenddants upon the aforesaid loan from plaintiff to
defendants in an action filed in the City Court of
Ogden City, Weber County, State of Utah,
entitled National Finance Company of Provo,
plaintiff, -vs- Dallas E. Daley and Flora Daley,
defendants, Civil No. 20232, and did, upon the
7th day of January, 1959, in said action obtain a
judgment in said Court in favor of this plaintiff
and against the defendants herein for the sum of
$668.12, with interest at the rate of 8% per annum
from the 7th day of January, 1959, which judgment is the judgment now sued upon in this
action."
For the purpose of this appeal, the plaintiff admits
that the defendants were adjudicated bankrupts subsequent to the entry of the judgment in the action
brought by the plaintiff against the defendants in the
City Court of Ogden City, Weber County, State of Utah,
and that the claim of the plaintiff, merged into such
Judgment, was duly scheduled in such bankruptcy
proceedings and that the defendants and each of them
were subsequently discharged in bankruptcy. Plaintiff
also admits that the suit brought in the City Court of
Ogden City was brought upon the note and that in the
City Court action there were no allegations in the
pleadings that the loan evidenced by such note was
obtained through false pretenses or false representations
or fraud.
The issue presented upon this appeal is whether or
not the District Court may now look beyond the record
and examine the facts relating to the manner in which
5
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the original obligation was incurred to determine
whether or not the adjudicated indebtness is one excepted
from the discharge in bankruptcy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEBTS INCURRED BY FALSE REPRESENTATIONS ARE NOT DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY.
Liabilities for obtaining money or property by
false pretenses or false representations are declared
among the debts not affected by a discharge of bankruptcy. Section 17a (2) of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.
C.A. 35) provides as follows :
"Debts not affected by a discharge."
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts, whether in full
or in part, except such as ... (2) are liabilities
for obtaining money or property by false pretenses or false representations . . . " (emphasis
supplied)
As the United States Supreme Court said in Pepper
vs. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, 84 Lawyers Addition 28, public
policy demands that the "act should be liberally construed so as to prevent the discharge in bankruptcy of a
liability which would not exist but for the fraudulent
conduct of the bankrupt."
A false financial statement given to obtain a loan
of money or to obtain property under an installment
sales contract will present the basis for a determination
that the obligation arising thereby is not dischargeable
6
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within the meaning of Section 17a (2) of the Act. While
there would seem to be no hard and fast rule as to what
constitutes a false representation in a financial statement, the omission, concealment, or understatement ·of
liabilities, when material, is considered to be sufficient.
The instances in which state courts have held that
an understatement of liabilities in a financial statement
constituted "false representations" are innumerable.
Typical are Railroad Employee's Person Loan Co. vs.
Dillon ( 1939) 123 N.J .L. 31, 7 A. (2nd) 855 ; Watts et.al.
vs. Ward (Mass. App. Div. N. District.) 29 B.T.L. 179;
Workingmen's Loan Association vs. Leslie Magoon, Mass.
App. Div. Boston Muni Ct. Dist. No. 157683; Personal
Finance Co. of Waterbury vs. Robinson, (1941) Supreme
Ct. Trial and Special Term, Madison County 27 N.Y.S.
(2d) 6; Personal Finance Co. of New York vs. Ralph L.
Vosburg, (S. Ct. N.Y. St. Lawrence, Jan. 13, 1942);
Chester-Neal Co. vs. Generazzo, (1942) 20 N.J. Mise.
296, 26 A (2nd) 867; also profitable to examine are other
factual situations held to be within Sec. 17a (2). To be
noted in this connection are Symmes vs. Rollins, (1928)
39 Ga. App. 546, 176 S.E. 516; Gregory vs. Williams,
(1920) 106 Kan. 819, 189 P. 932; Mathewson vs. Naylor,
(1937) 18 Cal. App. (2d) 741, 64 P. (2d) 979; Grespi &
Co. vs. Griffen, (1933) 132 Cal. App. 526, 23 P. (2d) 47;
Donahue vs. Conley, (1927) 85 Cal. App. 15, 258 P. 985;
Guernsey-Newton Co. vs. Napier, (1929) 151 Wash. 318,
275 P. 724.
POINT II
EVIDENCE OF FRAUD IS NOT A DEPARTURE
FROM A SUIT BASED UPON A JUDGMENT
7
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It is proper in avoidance of the defense of a discharge in bankruptcy to show such matters as will put
the case without the operation of the discharge of
bankruptcy. To illustrate, the false representations made
by way of a financial statement or declaration of
indebtedness are asserted, not to change the cause of
action from contract to fraud, but to prevent its being
barred by the bankrupt in bankruptcy. When the
affirmative defense of discharge in bankruptcy is
asserted, the plaintiff has opportunity to meet that
defense and to show that it does not constitute a bar to
the action. The plaintiff is not attempting to state a
different cause of action. This was emphasized by the
Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Gregory vs.
Williams, 106 Kan. 819, 198, P. 932, 933:
" ... The fraud was set up in the reply, not as a
cause of action against the defendant, but to
avoid the defense that had been pleaded ... The
action continued as an action on the promissory
note. The reply did not constitute a departure from
the cause of action alleged in the bill of particulars ..."
To demonstrate further, this theory of approach
was favorably recognized in Kiser vs. Gerald, (1920} 17
Ala. App. 648, 88 So. 49, 50. There the plaintiff instituted
action both on common counts for goods sold, and on
promissory notes. The answer asserted a discharge in
bankruptcy. In reply, the plaintiff set up the false
financial statement of the defendant, which was demurred on the ground that it constituted a departure by
setting up a new cause of action in fraud and deceit.
The demurrer was sustained by the lower court and the
8
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plaintiff appealed. The appellant court, in reversing
the trial court, said:
"When the bankrupt's discharge is pleaded to an
action on snch a debt, it is good replication that
the debt was created by fraud, etc., and the court
in which the action is brought has jurisdiction
to try the issue. Broadnax vs. Bradford, 50 Ala.
270; Blackman vs. McAdams, 131 Mo. App. 408,
111 S. W. 599 Jacobson vs. Horne 52 Miss. 186;
Argall vs. Jacobs, 87 N.Y. 110, 41 Am. Rep. 357.
There are many authorities cited in the foregoing adjudicated cases to the same effect. The case
of Strauch vs. Flynn, 108 Minn. 313, 1 22N.W.
320, cited in appellee's brief, while sustaining
appellee's contention, is opposed to the great
weight of authority as well as to good reason.
The replication does not set up a new cause of
action declared on, but simply alleges facts
exempting the plaintiff's claim from the operation
of the Bankruptcy Act. The court erred in its
ruling on the demurrer, and its judgment is
reversed . . ."
Some courts have held that a reply or replication is
not necessary on the theory that the plaintiff is presumed
to deny affirmative allegations and statements in the
defendant's answer. It was so held in the case of Delatour
vs. Lala, (1929) 12 La. App. 314, 125 So. 138, the third
syllabus of which case reads:
"Where defendant, in action on open account,
alleged relief from plaintiff's claim by discharge
in bankruptcy, plaintiff held entitled to show
9
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without further pleading that his debt was
excepted from discharge under Bankruptcy Act.
Sec. 17 (11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 35) because it was a
liability incurred by false pretenses and false
representations, since plaintiff is presumed to
deny affirmative allegations of defendant's
answer and, then when special defense is made,
there is no necessity resting upon plaintiff to
expressly challenge facts on which it is based."
See also Rules 7(a) and 8(d), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure hereinafter set out.
In this connection, see also Young vs. Grau, (1884)
14 R.I. 340, 342, involving an action in debt on a New
York Judgment where the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island took occasion to comment.
"A debt created by fraud is not void but voidable
only and therefore a creditor may assert both the
debt and the fraud at the same time, so long as he
asserts the fraud to avoid not the debt but the
discharge. The bankrupt act recognizes this when
it allows the creditor to prove the debt for a
dividend, and nevertheless, relieves it from the
discharge, for the debt is provable as a debt, not
as a tort."
Particularly satisfying is the case of Stewart vs.
Emerson (1872) 52 N.H. 301, 310, 311, where an action
was brought in assumpsit for the price of goods sold.
The defendant pleaded a discharge in bankruptcy to
which the plaintiff asserted the fraud of the defendant.
The court said:
"The plaintiff declares upon a promise of the
10
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defendant to pay for goods sold, and, if he
maintains his action, he maintains it upon the
contract of sale affirmed by him. When a party
has an election between two inconsistent rights
or remedies - - for instance, when he can rely
upon a contract or renounce the contract and rely
upon fraud-- and has knowledge of all the facts
material to be known in making a choice, his
selection of one may be a renunciation of another.
Butler vs. Hildreth1 5 Met. 49. But the plaintiff
in this case avers the fraud of the defendant, not
as the plaintiff's cause of action but as a refutation of the defendants alleged defense of discharge. The plaintiff claims to recover damages,
not for the defendant's fraud, but for the breach
of his promise to pay for the goods bought; and
in the replication he alleges the fraud not as the
ground on which his action rests, but to show that
there is no ground on which the defendant's
discharge can be applied to this debt. He asserts,
not that the sale was void for fraud, but that, by
reason of fraud, the debt was not discharged
under the bankrupt act. He asserts the fraud,
not for the purpose of rescinding the contract,
but to show that the defendant has not been
relieved from his obligation to perform his part
of the contract." (emphasis supplied)
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF, IN AN ACTION UPON A
JUDGMENT OR NOTE, IS NOT REQUIRED IN HIS
COMPLAINT TO ALLEGE FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION OF THE DEBTOR TO EXCEPT THE
11
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DEBT SUED UPON FROM THE BAR OF THE
DEBTOR'S DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY AND
MAY SHOW FRAUD OR MISREPRESENTATION
BY WAY OF REBUTTAL.
In pleading under the contract theory, an action is
brought as in an ordinary case of suit in contract or
assumpsit. In the particular case before the Court, the
suit has been brought upon the Judgment of the plaintiff
against the defendants. When the defendants assert
bankruptcy as a defense, the plaintiff, in rebuttal to the
defense of bankruptcy, may show that the obligation is
not dischargeable in bankruptcy under Section 17 of
the Bankruptcy Act, for the reason that the debt was
incurred by false pretenses of false representations within the meaning of that section. In other words, it is
proper in avoidance of the defense of a discharge in
bankruptcy to show such matters as will put the case
without the operation of the discharge such as false
representations made by way of a materially false
financial statement. Such evidence is offered not to
change the cause of the action from contract to fraud
but to show that the debt is not discharged in bankruptcy.
That this is good pleading would appear obvious,
for the defense of bankrupty is one which must be
pleaded (Rule 8(c) U.R.C.P.) and which until asserted
is not in issue. When asserted the plaintiff has opportunity to meet that defense and to show that it does not
constitute a bar to the action. Symmes vs. Rollins, (Ga.)
146 S.E. 42, Collier on Bankruptcy, 13th Ed., page 616;
Zimmern vs. Blount, 238 Fed. 740; Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of New York vs. Golombosky, (Conn.) 50 A. 2d 817.
12
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It should be kept in mind that, as hereinbefore discussed, the plaintiff in so doing is not attempting to
state a different cause of action.
Rule 7 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, relating
to pleadings allowed, provides as follows :

"Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an
answer; and there shall be a reply to a counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a crossclaim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; a
third party complaint, if leave is given under Rule
14 to summon a person who was not an original
party ; and there shall be a third party answer,
if a third party complaint is served. No other
pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third party
answer." (emphasis supplied}
Thus, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the
plaintiff is not permitted to reply to the affirmative
defense of discharge in bankruptcy. And such affirmative defense is "deemed as denied or avoided." Rule
8( d) U.R.C.P.
A California court has adopted the same approach.

An action was pleaded on the contract in Crespe & Co.
vs. Griffen et al. (1933) 132 Cal. App. 562, 23 P. 2d 47,
in case before the District Court of Appeals, 4th District
of California; there was no allegation of fraud asserted.
The defendant had been discharged in bankruptcy. An
appeal was taken from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant contending that the proof of misrepresentation and fraud was admitted in evidence when
it had not been pleaded. The California court, in af13
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firming the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, said:
" .... In the instant case the original obligation
is on a promissory note. Fraud was included and
incidental to the creation of that obligation. That
incident was properly urged without pleading to
avoid the plea of discharge in bankruptcy. Section 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides :
'Every material allegation of the complaint, not
controverted by the answer, must, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true; the statement of any new matter in the answer in avoidance or constituting a defense or counter claim
must, on the trial, be deemed controverted by the
opposite party."
A similar practice obtains in New York. In Frey
vs. Torrey, (1902) 75 N.Y. Sup. 40, 43, aff'd 175 N.Y.
501, it is thusly described:
"Subdivision 4 of 549, Code Civ. Proc.... (now
sec. 826 of C.P.A. Subdivision 10) classifies an
action to recover a debt induced by fraud as an
action on contract ... The claimant may sue on
contract and if the discharge in bankruptcy be
pleaded, he may, in rebuttal, show that the debt
was created by fraud, not to change his cause
of action from contract to fraud, but to prevent
its being barred by this discharge in bankruptcy ... "
As distinguished therefrom, the action was in contract in the case of Argall vs. Jacobs, et. al., (1881) 87
N.Y. 110, 114, and there, the court said:
" ... It was not needful that the plaintiff should
14
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allege fraud in his complaint. It was no part of
his cause of action. It was needful only for him
to prove it, not as a part of his cause of action,
but as an answer to the affirmative defense set
up. (Composition of creditors and discharge in
bankruptcy subsequent to the date of the note)
"In this cause the plaintiff could sue the defendants directly for the fraud or for the purchase
price of the goods; and in either case he would
have been obliged to surrender the notes upon
the trial; or he could use, as he did, suit upon
the notes; and in either case proof of the fraud
would be an answer to the bankruptcy discharge ..."
The decision in the Argall case was followed in the
much more recent case of Personal Finance Company
of Waterbury vs. Robinson, et al (1941) Supreme Court
Trial and Special Term, Madison County, 27 N.Y.S. 2d
6, 9. The status and development of the New York law
is most capably analyzed and considered by Justice Deyo
in this case. He declared :
"The question was specifically passed upon in
Argall vs. Jacobs 87 N.Y. 110, 41 Am. Rep. 357.
There, as in the case at bar, an action was brought
upon a promissory note and no fraud was alleged in the complaint. The answer, as here,
set up as an affirmative defense, a discharge
in bankruptcy. Upon the trial, the plaintiff
was permitted to give evidence tending to show
that his debt was 'created by the fraud of the
bankrupt,' which was the wording of the statute
at that time. The appellate court held this to
15
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be proper and affirmed the judgment for the
plaintiff, saying at page 113 of 87 N.W. 'But it
is further contended on the part of the defendants that the plaintiff cannot have the benefit
of the limitation contained in the act of 1867,
because he did not base his cause of action upon
the alleged fraud, but upon the promissory notes,
making no allusion to the fraud in his complaint.
It is not provided that no cause of action for
fraud shal be discharged, but that "no debt
created by fraud" shall be discharged.
These
promissory notes were debts of the defendants,
and the plaintiff was induced by the fraud of
the defendants to sell goods to them and take
their notes therefor, and hence these debts were
created by their fraud within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act. It was not needful that the
plaintiff should allege the fraud in his complaint.
It was no part of his cause of action. It was
needful only to him to prove it, not as part of his
cause of action, but as an answer to the affirmative defenses set up.
"A similar decision was reached in Frey vs.
Torrey, 70 App. Div. 166, 75 N.Y.S. 40, affirmed
175 N.Y. 501, 67 N.E. 1082, subsequently overruled on other grounds in Tindle vs. Berkett, 183
N.Y. 267, 76 N.E. 25, affirmed 205 U.S. 183, 27
S Ct. 49·3 51 L. Ed. 762, on the authority of
Crawford vs. Burke, 195 U.S. 176, 25 S. St. 9,
49, L. Ed. 147. In this case, the Court said at
page 171 of 70 App. Div., at page 43 of 75 N.Y.S.'
'The claimant may sue on contract, and if the
16
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discharge in bankruptcy be pleaded he may, in
rebuttal, show that the debt was created by fraud,
not to change his cause of action from contract
to fraud, but to prevent its being barred by the
discharge of bankruptcy.
"Although the proof submitted by the defendant
is not as full and complete as might be desired,
it is sufficient to indicate that there is a genuine
question of fact to be determined relative to the
character of the claim asserted. That being the
case, the matter cannot and should not be summarily decided on this motion (Munoz & Co., vs.
Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 118 Misc. 24,
193 N.Y.S. 422, regardless of defects and omissions in the pleadings ( Erzinger vs. Lieberman,
218 App. Div. 847, 219 N.Y.S. 28), for such defects may conceivably be removed by amendment
at the trial or sooner. Curry vs. Mackenzie, 239
N.Y. 267, 146 N.E. 375."
The recent Utah case of National Finance Company
of Utah vs. Valdez, 11 Utah 2d 339, 359 P. 2d 9, is an
action against a bankrupt upon a note and chattel mortgage which the bankrupt alleged represented a debt
which had been discharged in bankruptcy, the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah held that the loan evidenced
by a promissory note had been obtained by fraud and
was excepted from discharge in bankruptcy and that
the plaintiff could maintain the action upon the note
and was not confined to an action for fraud, the Utah
Court stating as follows:
"In considering the question before us, it must
17
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be remembered that a discharge in bankruptcy
is neither a payment nor the extinguishment of
debts. It is simply a bar to their enforcement
by legal proceedings. Thus, the note here sued
upon was not extinguished by the bankruptcy, but
is still in existence and its collection enforceable
if excepted from a discharge under Section 17
of the Bankruptcy Act.
"We believe that a loan, evidenced by a promissory note which is obtained by fraud is excepted
from a discharge in bankruptcy. This being so,
the plaintiff here could maintain its action on the
note and was not confined to an action based
upon fraud. In Section 17 it is not provided
that a cause of action for fraud is not discharged,
but that no debt created by fraud shall be discharged.
"The defendant's final contention is that the
plaintiff, by electing to rely upon the contract,
had waived the issue of fraud. This contention,
for the reasons heretofore set forth, is without
merit."
POINT IV
IN A SUIT UPON A JUDGEMENT, THE COURT
MAY AND SHOULD RECEIVE EVIDENCE BEYOND
THE RECORD AND EXAMINE THE FACTS AND
CHARACTER OF THE ORIGINAL OBLIGATION
TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT DEBT IS ONE EXCEPTED FROM THE
DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY.
The introductory comment to the Annotation at
18
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170 A.L.R. 368, cited by Appellant states as follows:
''Frequently, a debt which was nondischargeable
in its original fonn has been supplemented by
a form of obligation, such as a note or a judgment,
which is not in any of the classes of debts excepted
frorn the operation of the discharge, and is,
presumptively at least, dischargeable unless the
court may go behind the note or the judgment
and ascertain the character of the original
obligation as one not dischareable. In such cases,
the courts have pretty uniformly held that the
transformation of the evidences of the original
nondischargeable obligation does not render it
dischargeable, as the court may look through
the new form and discover that the indebtedness
in its inception was of a character nondischargeable. (emphasis supplied)
"Thus, it has been generally held that a claim
which is not dischargeable under the provision of
the bankruptcy Act is not rendered dischargeable
by the recovery of a judgment thereon. In such
case the judgment itself is not dischargeable.
Parker vs. Whittier (1899) CCA 1st 91 F 511, 1
Am. Bankr. 621 (writ of certorari denied in (1898)
147 US 802, 32 L. Ed. 1187, 19 S. Ct. 887) ;
Thompson vs. Judy (1909; CCA 6th) 169 F. 553,
22 Am. Bankr. 154; Peters vs. United States
(1910; CCA 4th) 177 F 885, 24 Am. Bankr. 206
(writ of certiorari denied in (1909) 217 US 606,
54 LEd 900, 30 S. Ct. 696). Whoerle vs. Ganclini
(1910) 158 Cal. 107, 109 P. 888. Moody vs.
niuscegee 1'Ifg. Co. (1910) 134 Ga 721, 68 SE
19
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604, 20 Ann Cas. 301. Oberreich vs. Foster (1909
148 Ill. A pp. 297 (affirmed in (1907) 230 ill. 525,
82 NE 858; Halsy vs. Jordan (1910) 155 Ill. App.
144. State ex rel. Wheatley vs. Beck (1911) 175
Ind. 312, 93 NE 664. Wade vs. Clark (1879) 52
Iowa 158, 2 NW 1039, 35 Am Rep 262. Brown vs.
Hannagan (1911) 210 Mass. 246, 96 NE 714 27
Am. Bankr. 294. Simpson vs. Simpson (1879) 80
NC 332. Chambers vs. Kirk (1914) 41 Okla 696,
139 P. 986, 32 Am. Bankr. 175. Young vs. Grau
(1884) 14 RI 340."

It was held in Gehlen vs. Patterson, (1928) 83 N.H.
328, 141 A. 914, that the fact that an action has been
instituted on a promissory note, rather than on the fraud
which was practiced in obtaining the loan for which the
note was given, and the fact that a judgment has been
recovered in such action and an action has been insituted
on the judgment, does not preclude the judgment creditor
from showing that by reason of the fraud in the inception
of the debt the judgment recovered was saved from the
relief of the discharge in bankruptcy under statutory
exception therefrom of certain classes of liabilities. The
Court said:
"Here the note was reduced to judgment before
the bankruptcy and the action is on the judgment
debt. But if the note was a liability for fraud in
the sense that the loan for which it was given was
obtained by fraud, no less is the judgment such
a liability. The note became merged in the judgment, but the fact that the loan it represented
was thus obtained applies to the judgment debt
as much as the note. That the plaintiff should
20
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suffer by having reduced the note to judgment
before the bankruptcy would be to impose a
vicarious penalty which Congress is not to be
assumed to have intended in the absence of
language clearly showing such a purpose."
It has been held that proof against the estate of the
bankrupt of a claim reduced to judgment, although the
judginent was obtained on a promissory note and not on
the fraud which existed in the obtainment of the loan
for which the note was given, does not preclude the
judgment creditor from showing that the bankrupt was
under liability to her for obtaining money from her by
fraud. Gehlen vs. Patterson, (1928) 83 N.H. 328, 141 A
914, 17 Am. Bankr. NS 131.
The liability of an insurance agent for failure to
return to the insurance Company premiums received by
it on policies issued, and for cashing a check with the
insurance company drawn on a bank in which he had no
account, is excepted from the discharge in bankruptcy
of such insurance agent by the provisions of Sec. 17 of
the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 35).
In the case of Lyon vs. Lyon, 115 Utah 466, 206 P.
2d 148 plaintiff brought suit against her former husband
on a property settlement incorporated into a decree of
divorce. Subsequent to the property settlement and the
divorce, the defendant had taken Bankruptcy and
scheduled the Judgment debt to the wife. The defendant
contended that the obligation was discharged in Bankruptcy, and that the plaintiff could not recover. The
Trial Court had permitted evidence of conversations
prior to the making of the property settlement to
21
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determine the nature of the settlement and, on such
evidence held that the obligation was not dischargeable
as it was excepted from discharge by Section 17 of the
Bankruptcy Act as a "debt . . . for alimony due or to
become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or
child."
To the defendant's objection that the trial erred in
permitting evidence outside the judgment record to be
introduced and received in evidence to determine the
nature of the obligation, the Utah Supreme Court held
that Courts will look behind a judgment to ascertain
whether the obligation which was merged in the judgment
is dischargeable in bankruptcy, saying at page 472 of
the Utah Reports:
"It may be true, as contended by defendant, that
as a general rule a trial court will not look behind
a judgment or decree to determine the nature
thereof, unless it is so ambiguous or uncertain
that extrinsic evidence is necessary to explain it.
However, plaintiff has cited to us a number of
cases holding that courts will look behind a
judgment to ascertain whether the obligation
which was merged in the judgment was dischargeable in bankruptcy ... (citing cases). The rule
announced in the cases and texts above cited is
reasonable and necessary to give full effect to
the legislative intent. Otherwise} many obligations
intended to be excepted from the discharge
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act might nevertheless become discharged simply because they
had been merged in judgments or into written
contracts. The Court did not err in receiving
22
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extrinsic evidence to show the true nature of the
obligation of defendant to plaintiff." (emphasis
supplied)

The defendant-appellants in their Brief, having
admitted that there is much authority to the effect that
the Court may receive evidence extrinsic of the judgment
record to detennine the true nature of the obligation and
its dischargeability in bankruptcy, attempt to convince
the court that the "weight of authority" and the "majority" of the decisions are to the contrary. Plaintiff has not
counted the decisions and doubts that defendants or the
authors they cite have counted them. Suffice it to say,
that the Utah Courts, and the better reasoned decisions
all hold that the trial court may look outside the judgment
record to determine the nature of the obligation merged
into the judgment and whether or not it is excepted from
discharge.
Various other recent and well-considered cases,
including a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals (Cir.
2) have held that where the record does not disclose the
nature of the underlying obligation, it may be proved
alinude in determining the dischargeability of a judgment. Greenfield vs. Tuccillo, (1942), (Cir. 2), 129 Fed.
2d 854.
In the important recent opinion in Fidelity &
Casuality Company of New York vs. Golomosky, (1946)
133 Conn. 317, 50 A. (2d) 817, 819, 820. Nate 60 Harv. L.
Rev. 638 (1947), the Supreme Court of E1rrors of
Connecticut unequivocably declared that the judgmentcreditor should be permitted to prove, by evidence dehors
the record of the action, that the note upon which the
23
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judgment was based represented money misappropriated
by the defendant, and that the debt was not within the
defendant's discharge in bankruptcy. In so ruling the
Court in effect, although not expressly, overruled its
earlier decision in Consolidated Plan of Conn. Inc. vs.
Bonitatibus 130 Conn. 199, 33 A 2d 140. With respect to
its ruling in the Bonitatibus case the Court said:
"We held that the plaintiff could not, in support
of its reply, go beyond the judgment and the
record in the first action and offer evidence that
the loan was obtained by false representations.
Whether, in view of our present decision, we
would adhere to that conclusion should such a
situation again be presented, we have no need to
consider."
It is interesting to observe that the reasoning in
this case flatly rejects the doctrine of waiver where the
misrepresentation is asserted only to avoid the defense
of a discharge in bankruptcy. The Court said:
"The decisions which have held that in determining the nature of the indebtedness a court cannot
go behind the judgment record seem generally to
have overlooked two principles which the cases
place beyond dispute : Where an action is brought
upon a note, and a discharge in bankruptcy is set
up as a defense, proof is admissable to show that
the underlying debt was created by fraud or one
of the other excepted causes. American Surety Co.
vs. McKiearnan, 304 Mich. 322, 8 N.W. 2d 82, 145
ALR 1235, and note, 1238; Zimmerern vs. Blount,
238 F. 740,745, 151 C. C. A.-5, 90; and the rendition
24
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of a judgment upon an obligation does not change
the Character of the indebterness. Boynton vs.
Ball, 121 U.S. 457, 466, 7 S. Ct. 981, 30 L. Ed. 985;
Brown vs. Hannagan, Supra; Guernsey-Newton
Co. vs. Napier, 151 Wash. 318. 320, 275 P. 724;
Argall vs. J adobs, 87 N.Y. 110, 113 41 Am. Rep.
357; Wade vs. Clark 52 Iowa 158, 159, 2 N.W.
1039 35 Am. Rep. 262; Young vs. Grau, supra.
In the light if these accepted principles, there
would seem to be no escape from the conclusion
that the redition of a judgment based upon a
note does not preclude proof by evidence extraneous to the record, in reply to a defense of
discharge in bankruptcy, that the underlying debt
was created by fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation within the exception we
are considering. Moreover, some of the decisions
above cited falling within the first category seem
to regard proof that the debt was created by one
of these causes by means of evidence dehors the
rendered as involving an attack upon that judgment; that clearly is not so, the plaintiff sues
upon the judgment, the defendant pleads a
defense entirely exteraneous to the action in
which the judgment was rendered, i.e., his discharge and the plaintiff attacks his right to avail
himself of that defense; the plaintiff is in no
sense attacking the judgment but is throughout
insisting upon his right to recover upon it in the
manner and form in which it was rendered."
(emphasis supplied)

In Ghelen vs. Patterson, (1928) 83 N. H. 329, 141 A.
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914, 915, 916, 917, the plaintiff had brought suit on the

note and obtained judgment prior to the debtor's discharge in bankruptsy. The bankrupt contended that the
judgment - debt was released by the discharge even
though the loan for which the note was given was obtained by fraud. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
held that by virtue of the fraud the judgment in contract was not discharged, saying in part:
"It follows that neither the action on the note
nor the present action on the judgment debt barred
an action for the fraud, any more than the proof
of claim against the defendant's bankrupt estate.
And the fraud may be pleaded to save the judgment from its release by the discharge in bankruptcy.
"It follows that liabilities for fraudulently obtaining property, as intended by the amendment,
mean claims arising out of such conduct.. Whatever maybe the form of action sued on, if it appears that the cause of action arose from such
fraud as the section specifies, the liability set
forth in the action is undischarged. Lund vs. Bull,
supra; Raymond vs. Cohen, 80 N.Y. 586, 112 A.
909. Claims created by the fraud of one acting
in an official or fiduciary capacity. are not discharged whether or not they are 'provable debts'
at the date of bankruptcy (Brown vs. Hannagan,
supra), and it must be equally true that the discharge of liabilities for fraudently obtaining property otherwise does not depend upon the status
of such debts. The test is not of ability to show
that at the date of bankruptcy there was a prov26
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able claim of fraud, but is of ability to show that
there was then a provable liability of some kind
which sprang from the bankrupt's fraud.
Zimmern vs. Blount, (C.C.A.) 238 Fed. 740;
Gregory vs. Williams, 106 Kan. 819, 189 P. 932.
"The note became merged in the judgment, but
the fact that the loan it represented was thus
obtained applies to the judgment debt as much as
to the note. That the plaintiff should suffer by
having reduced the note to judgment before the
bankruptcy would be to impose a vicarious penalty
which Congress is not to be assumed to have intended, in the absence of language clearly showing such a purpose."
The decision in Gehlen vs. Patterson, supra, is also
noteworthy because of its complete repudiation of the
theory that the fraud had been waived.
The Court
declared:
"Nor was there an election of remedies in suing
on the note rather than for the fraud. The
plaintiff had two causes of action which were
separate and independent and she had more than
a choice between them. Suit on one was not inconsistent with suit on the other. Suit for the
fraud would not destroy liability on the note but
on the contrary would affirm it. Conversely,
suit on the note did not affect or necessarily
raise the issue of fraud. While payment of one
claim might liquidate in full or in part the damages for the other, yet until such payment both
claims may be sued on at the same time and, under
what seems the better procedure, judgments be
27
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obtained in both.
The judgments would not
mutually conflict, although satisfaction of one
would operate to satisfy in full or in part the
other. 'Where the remedies afforded are inconsistent, it is the election of one that bars the
other; where they are consistent, it is the satisfaction which operates as a bar.' . Frederickson
vs. Nye, 110 Oh. St. 459, 144 N.E. 299, 35 A.L.R.
1163. Parallel situations are found in the frequent instances of separate suits at the same time
on a note and in foreclosure of its security and
in separate actions against joint wrongdoers."
As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of National Finance Company of Utah vs. Valdez 11
Utah 2d 339, 359 P. 2d 9, discussed above, " ... a discharge in bankruptcy is neither a payment nor the extinguishment of debts. It is simply a bar to their enforcement by legal proceedings," and, "a loan evidenced
by a promissory note which i~ 6-btained by fraud is
excepted from a discharge in bankruptcy."
The respondent contends that a loan evidenced by
a promissory note obtained by fraud being excepted
from a discharge in bankruptcy, so also is a judgment
upon such promissory note evidencing a loan obtained
by fraud.
As it so often happens, and, has happened in the
case before this Court, a lender may not be aware of the
fraud in the inception of the loan contract at the time
he finds it necessary to institute action on the note.
The fraud isn't discovered until disclosed through or
as a result of the bankruptcy proceedings when the
28
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bankrupt lists his obligations and the dates when incurred as required by the General Orders and Forms for
bankruptcy. Under such circu1nstances, the Courts are
particularly hesitant in applying the doctrines of waiver
and election of remedies, for indeed-how can there
be a waiver or an election when the existence of the
second cause of action is unknown. The case of ChesterNeal Co. vs. Generazzo, (1942) 20 N.J. Misc. 296, 26 A.
~d 876, was submitted to the Court on stipulated facts
whereby it was agreed that the defendant, in obtaining
a loan fro1n the plaintiff, represented, in writing, that
he had no outstanding indebtedness. The financial statement was false when made, to defendant's knowledge, in
that he owed debts to a series of other finance and merchandising cmnpanies. When the defendant defaulted,
plaintiff, still ignorant of the falsity of the representations, sued defendant on the note and recovered judgment. Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition in bankruptcy and the plaintiff discovered the false representation. The Court held that the plaintiff was not subject
to the defense of election of remedies in bringing the
second suit based on a cause of action in fraud.
In Personal Finance Company of New Haven vs.
~lc~lahon (1943) Davlin, Jr., Ct. of Com. Pleas, New
Haven Co., Conn., the Court, by Memorandum of Denlurrer stated:
"The former action in this case was on the note.
The essentials for bringing of the fraud action
did not come into existence until after the defendant had filed his petition in bankruptcy and
therein disclosed the fraud. Where the fraud is
not discovered until after entry of judgment on
29
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the contract an action for damages for fraud will
lie. Local Loan Co., Inc. vs. Guinessey, 33 N.Y.S.
2d 62. The test is not whether the causes of action
arise out of the same general subject matter,
but whether one action produces a status which
necessarily bars the other. Two causes of action
existed in this case, one on the note and the other
for fraud. The original action dealt only with
the former. No claim was made in the latter
because the existence of facts to support it were
not known."
The argument of appellant that in cases holding
that the court may look outside the record there has
only been one step in the proceedings, whereas in the
case now before the Court there has been two (suit on
note plus suit on judgment based on note), is without
merit.
The test is whether the debt is one incurred
through "false pretenses or misrepresentations" not how
far the creditor has gone before it is discovered or how
far creditor has proceeded before the debtor takes out
bankruptcy.
To the appellant's argument that to permit extrinsic
evidence to be introduced to determine the nature of the
debt merged in the judgment would cause the bankrupt
"unreasonable harassment," suffice it to say, that it is
the intention of the Bankruptcy Act that debts incurred
through "false pretenses or misrepresentations" should
not be discharged or bared. If a. person has cheated or
defrauded another, he should not complain that he is
subjected to litigation as a result thereof, and if that be
"unreasonable harassment," then it is intended by the
bankruptcy act that such persons be so harassed.
30
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That the statement contained in 8 C.J.S Bankruptcy
Sec. 587, cited by appellant accurately states a view
that has been adopted by some courts, however, such
view point as set forth in C.J.S. is supported only by
the citation of two cases and is contrary to the better
reasoned opinions and the prior decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The defendants prior to this action never having
asserted their discharge in bankruptcy, the plaintiff is
not bared from showing that the obligation merged into
plaintiff's judgment was incurred through the fraud or
misrepresentations of the defendants, and is, thus, excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. The trial court
in this action on such judgment may look beyond the
record of the Ogden City Court action to ascertain
whether or not the obligation which was merged in the
Judgment entered by the Ogden City Court is excepted
from discharge in bankruptcy, and, the defendants Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings was, therefore, properly
denied by the District Court.
Respectfuly submitted,
E. MORGAN WIXOM
1010 First Security Bank Building
Ogden, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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